50 Years Ago Today – As Cuban Situation Heats Up, Mullinnix Enroute to Mejillones Bay
Excerpt from “The Last Gun Ship - History of USS Mullinnix DD-944” - A Historical Novel By Frank A. Wood
17 October: In the morning, Adlai Stevenson writes to President Kennedy that world opinion would equate the US missiles stationed in Turkey with Soviet bases in Cuba. Warning that US officials could not “negotiate with a gun at our head,” he states, “I feel you should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything.” Stevenson suggests that personal emissaries should be sent to both Fidel Castro and Premier Khrushchev.
At about the same time, Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet embassy official who served as an authoratitative back channel for communications between Soviet and US leaders, relays a message from Premier Khruskchev to Attorney General Robert Kennedy that the arms being sent to Cuba are intended only for defensive purposes. Bolshakov had not been told by Khrushchev that the Soviet Union is actually in the process of installing MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. By the time Bolshakov’s message reaches President Kennedy, he has already been fully briefed on the Soviet missile deployment. An SS-5 IRBM is detected. The SS-5s have ranges of up to 2,200 nautical miles, more than twice the range of the SS-4 MRBMs. The GMAIC estimates that the IRBM sites would not become operational before December but that sixteen and possibly as many as thirty-two MRBMs would b e operational in about a week.
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17 October: Mullinnix conducts general visiting for the local population in Valparaiso. At 2245 she completed taking on 42,294 gallons of NSFO.
18 October: A Chilean boy scout, Hugo San Marteen, receives a contusion aboard Mullinnix of his right lower leg and foot, when his foot became pinned under the outboard end of the ship’s brow, which was surging considerably. HMC Freeman examined him and sent him to the local hospital for x-rays.
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18 October: United States conducts a 1.59 Megaton yield Hydrogen bomb test, code name “CHAMA Dominic Airdrop test” over Johnston Island area
1100 18 October: The ExComm convenes for further discussions. The JCS, attending part of the meeting, recommends that President Kennedy order an airstrike on the missiles and other key Cuban military installations. Robert Kennedy responds by asking whether a surprise air attack would be a morally acceptable course of action.
1430 18 October: More discussions take place in Dan Rusk’s conference room at the State Department. President Kennedy, who does not attend the talks, confers privately with Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara at 1530. Kennedy also meets privately with Dean Acheson for over an hour. The president raises his brother’s concern over the morality of a “Pearl Harbor in reverse.” Acheson tells Kennedy that he was being “silly” and that it was “unworthy of him to talk that way.”
This discussion was persuasive to some, as with Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillion. It becomes the deciding factor behind the support for a blockade.
1700 18 October: Andrei Gromyko meets with President Kennedy at the White House. Gromyko charges that the United States is “pestering” a small country. Gromyko states that “he was instructed to make it clear…that Soviet military assistance, was pursued solely for the purpose of contribution to the defense of Cuba…If it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never had become involved in rendering such assistance.”
Kennedy decides not to discuss US awareness of the missiles to Gromyko.
2100 18 October: ExComm presents its recommendations to the president. By this time most members of the committee support the blockade option. As the meeting progresses however, individual opinions begin to shift and the consensus behind the blockage breaks down. Kennedy directs the group to continue its deliberations.
The first of a series of daily “Joint Evaluation” reports is released. The evaluation, the product of collaboration between the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), states that the MRBMs in Cuba could probably be launched within eighteen hours.
1100 19 October: ExComm decides to break into separate working groups to develop the blockade and airstrike options, drafting speeches for each plan. The groups exchange and critique each other’s speeches. Support for the airstrike begins to shift towards the blockade and the airstrike speech is abandoned. Theodore Sorensen works on the president’s speech until 0300.
2040 19 October: A specific timetable is developed to carry out all diplomatic and military actions required. The schedule includes raising military alert levels (for all forces around the world including Mullinnix), reinforcing Guantanamo naval base and briefing NATO allies. All timing revolves around the “P Hour” – the time when President Kennedy would address the nation to inform Americans of the crisis.
That evening, a Defense Department spokesperson has to respond to an article dealing with Soviet missiles in Cuba. His reply is that the Pentagon has no information indication that there are missiles in Cuba and denies that emergency military measures are being implemented
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0434 19 October: Mullinnix liberty was officially over at 0300. However, YN3 Alton Keith staggered on board at 0434. But, he beat BM3 John Burden by 30 minutes. Not to be out done by his shipmates, SK2 Elbert Cunningham waltz onboard at 0530. Cunningham could always hold his liquor.
Task Force 86 left Valparaiso at 0855, enroute to Mejillones Bay (Del Sun), just north of Antofagasta, on the edge of Chile’s immense northern desert. At the same time, units of the Peruvian fleet left El Callao for Mejillones Bay.
En route to Mejillones, Presidente Pinto (ex-USS Zenobia) served as a simulated convoy while Picuda, Simpson and Thomson skillfully tried to penetrate the destroyer screen around her. Chilean Air Force aviators joined the exercise, cooperating with the surface units in their relentless hunt for the ‘attacking’ submarines. Later that day, the ship refueled from the anchored ship MONTT, taking on 49,492 gallons of NSFO, then anchored out in Mejillones Bay.
At Mejillones three Peruvian destroyers joined the task force. They were the BAP Villar DD-71 (ex-USS Benham DD-796), BAP Guise DD-72 (ex-USS Isherwood DD-520) and BAP Castillas DE-61 (ex-USS Bangust, DE-739). The submarines, BAP Dos De Mayo SS-41, BAP Abtao SS-42, BAP Angamos SS-43 and BAP Iquique SS-44, which joined en route, were Abtao class (initially known as the Lobo class), modified US Mackerel class, 825 tons standard, 1,400 tons submerged.
The submarines attempted to bottle up the task force in Mejillones Bay, but the surface unites succeeded in evading the subs’ surveillance, heading for the calm waters of the open Pacific.
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20 October: US conducts a Low kiloton yield text, code name CHECKMATE Dominic High Altitude test on Missile test over Johnston Island Area.
0900 20 October: ExComm finalizes the planning for the implementation of a naval blockade. Sorensen’s draft speech for the president is amended and approved. As McNamara leaves the room, he phones the Pentagon and orders four tactical squadrons to be readied for a possible airstrike on Cuba. He explains, “If the president doesn’t accept our recommendation, there won’t be time to do it later.”
1430 20 October: The president meets with the full group of planners. He notes that the airstrike plan is not a “surgical” strike but a massive military commitment that could involve heavy casualties on all sides. As if to underscore the scale of the proposed US military attack on Cuba, one member of the JCS suggests the use of nuclear weapons, saying that the Soviet Union would use its nuclear weapons in an attack. President Kennedy focuses on implementing the blockade option, calling it the only course of action compatible with American principles. Kennedy’s address to the nation is set for 1900 on 22 October. Kennedy cancels the remainder of his midterm election campaign trip. Kennedy instructs Sorensen to redraft the quarantine speech, although he notes that he would not make a final decision on whether to opt for the quarantine or an airstrike until he has consulted one last time with air force officials the next morning.
Later than night, James Reston, Washington Bureau Chief for the New York Times is given a partial briefing on the situation but is requested to hold the story in the interests of national security. In addition, a nuclear warhead storage bunker is identified at one of the Cuban MRBM sites.
20 October: The Navy activates Task Force 135, consisting of the attack carriers Enterprise and Independence. The Atlantic Fleet Commander ordered A-3J heavy attack squadrons from Air Wing 6 to be replaced by Marine Corps A-4D Skyhawk Squadron 225, a light attack unit. The Air Force's Defense Command deployed several of F-104 fighters to Key West.
The USS Charles P. Cecil DDR-835 receives word to get underway in the afternoon. The Cecil had two of three duty sections on liberty, causing the ship to be shorthanded. The Norfolk shore patrol locate Cecil’s CO Rozier having lunch with his family at Fat Boy's North Carolina Pit Barbecue, notifying him to report to the squadron commodore at D&S Piers. Commander Destroyer Squadron 26, Captain William Hunnicutt, after discussion with the commanding officers, agreed that USS Charles P. Cecil DDR-835 and USS Stickell DDR-888, should sail for combat operations with no fewer than 225 men on board. The Stickell departs at 8:30 P.M. with only 150 of her crew aboard. Cecil gets underway shortly after with 200 and a mixed group of 100 men borrowed from other ships, 25 for the Cecil and 75 to be transferred to the Stickell upon rendezvous later.
To be continued... Woody
17 October: In the morning, Adlai Stevenson writes to President Kennedy that world opinion would equate the US missiles stationed in Turkey with Soviet bases in Cuba. Warning that US officials could not “negotiate with a gun at our head,” he states, “I feel you should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything.” Stevenson suggests that personal emissaries should be sent to both Fidel Castro and Premier Khrushchev.
At about the same time, Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet embassy official who served as an authoratitative back channel for communications between Soviet and US leaders, relays a message from Premier Khruskchev to Attorney General Robert Kennedy that the arms being sent to Cuba are intended only for defensive purposes. Bolshakov had not been told by Khrushchev that the Soviet Union is actually in the process of installing MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. By the time Bolshakov’s message reaches President Kennedy, he has already been fully briefed on the Soviet missile deployment. An SS-5 IRBM is detected. The SS-5s have ranges of up to 2,200 nautical miles, more than twice the range of the SS-4 MRBMs. The GMAIC estimates that the IRBM sites would not become operational before December but that sixteen and possibly as many as thirty-two MRBMs would b e operational in about a week.
18 October: A Chilean boy scout, Hugo San Marteen, receives a contusion aboard Mullinnix of his right lower leg and foot, when his foot became pinned under the outboard end of the ship’s brow, which was surging considerably. HMC Freeman examined him and sent him to the local hospital for x-rays.
1100 18 October: The ExComm convenes for further discussions. The JCS, attending part of the meeting, recommends that President Kennedy order an airstrike on the missiles and other key Cuban military installations. Robert Kennedy responds by asking whether a surprise air attack would be a morally acceptable course of action.
1430 18 October: More discussions take place in Dan Rusk’s conference room at the State Department. President Kennedy, who does not attend the talks, confers privately with Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara at 1530. Kennedy also meets privately with Dean Acheson for over an hour. The president raises his brother’s concern over the morality of a “Pearl Harbor in reverse.” Acheson tells Kennedy that he was being “silly” and that it was “unworthy of him to talk that way.”
This discussion was persuasive to some, as with Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillion. It becomes the deciding factor behind the support for a blockade.
1700 18 October: Andrei Gromyko meets with President Kennedy at the White House. Gromyko charges that the United States is “pestering” a small country. Gromyko states that “he was instructed to make it clear…that Soviet military assistance, was pursued solely for the purpose of contribution to the defense of Cuba…If it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would never had become involved in rendering such assistance.”
Kennedy decides not to discuss US awareness of the missiles to Gromyko.
2100 18 October: ExComm presents its recommendations to the president. By this time most members of the committee support the blockade option. As the meeting progresses however, individual opinions begin to shift and the consensus behind the blockage breaks down. Kennedy directs the group to continue its deliberations.
The first of a series of daily “Joint Evaluation” reports is released. The evaluation, the product of collaboration between the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) and the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC), states that the MRBMs in Cuba could probably be launched within eighteen hours.
1100 19 October: ExComm decides to break into separate working groups to develop the blockade and airstrike options, drafting speeches for each plan. The groups exchange and critique each other’s speeches. Support for the airstrike begins to shift towards the blockade and the airstrike speech is abandoned. Theodore Sorensen works on the president’s speech until 0300.
2040 19 October: A specific timetable is developed to carry out all diplomatic and military actions required. The schedule includes raising military alert levels (for all forces around the world including Mullinnix), reinforcing Guantanamo naval base and briefing NATO allies. All timing revolves around the “P Hour” – the time when President Kennedy would address the nation to inform Americans of the crisis.
That evening, a Defense Department spokesperson has to respond to an article dealing with Soviet missiles in Cuba. His reply is that the Pentagon has no information indication that there are missiles in Cuba and denies that emergency military measures are being implemented
Task Force 86 left Valparaiso at 0855, enroute to Mejillones Bay (Del Sun), just north of Antofagasta, on the edge of Chile’s immense northern desert. At the same time, units of the Peruvian fleet left El Callao for Mejillones Bay.
En route to Mejillones, Presidente Pinto (ex-USS Zenobia) served as a simulated convoy while Picuda, Simpson and Thomson skillfully tried to penetrate the destroyer screen around her. Chilean Air Force aviators joined the exercise, cooperating with the surface units in their relentless hunt for the ‘attacking’ submarines. Later that day, the ship refueled from the anchored ship MONTT, taking on 49,492 gallons of NSFO, then anchored out in Mejillones Bay.
At Mejillones three Peruvian destroyers joined the task force. They were the BAP Villar DD-71 (ex-USS Benham DD-796), BAP Guise DD-72 (ex-USS Isherwood DD-520) and BAP Castillas DE-61 (ex-USS Bangust, DE-739). The submarines, BAP Dos De Mayo SS-41, BAP Abtao SS-42, BAP Angamos SS-43 and BAP Iquique SS-44, which joined en route, were Abtao class (initially known as the Lobo class), modified US Mackerel class, 825 tons standard, 1,400 tons submerged.
The submarines attempted to bottle up the task force in Mejillones Bay, but the surface unites succeeded in evading the subs’ surveillance, heading for the calm waters of the open Pacific.
0900 20 October: ExComm finalizes the planning for the implementation of a naval blockade. Sorensen’s draft speech for the president is amended and approved. As McNamara leaves the room, he phones the Pentagon and orders four tactical squadrons to be readied for a possible airstrike on Cuba. He explains, “If the president doesn’t accept our recommendation, there won’t be time to do it later.”
1430 20 October: The president meets with the full group of planners. He notes that the airstrike plan is not a “surgical” strike but a massive military commitment that could involve heavy casualties on all sides. As if to underscore the scale of the proposed US military attack on Cuba, one member of the JCS suggests the use of nuclear weapons, saying that the Soviet Union would use its nuclear weapons in an attack. President Kennedy focuses on implementing the blockade option, calling it the only course of action compatible with American principles. Kennedy’s address to the nation is set for 1900 on 22 October. Kennedy cancels the remainder of his midterm election campaign trip. Kennedy instructs Sorensen to redraft the quarantine speech, although he notes that he would not make a final decision on whether to opt for the quarantine or an airstrike until he has consulted one last time with air force officials the next morning.
Later than night, James Reston, Washington Bureau Chief for the New York Times is given a partial briefing on the situation but is requested to hold the story in the interests of national security. In addition, a nuclear warhead storage bunker is identified at one of the Cuban MRBM sites.
20 October: The Navy activates Task Force 135, consisting of the attack carriers Enterprise and Independence. The Atlantic Fleet Commander ordered A-3J heavy attack squadrons from Air Wing 6 to be replaced by Marine Corps A-4D Skyhawk Squadron 225, a light attack unit. The Air Force's Defense Command deployed several of F-104 fighters to Key West.
The USS Charles P. Cecil DDR-835 receives word to get underway in the afternoon. The Cecil had two of three duty sections on liberty, causing the ship to be shorthanded. The Norfolk shore patrol locate Cecil’s CO Rozier having lunch with his family at Fat Boy's North Carolina Pit Barbecue, notifying him to report to the squadron commodore at D&S Piers. Commander Destroyer Squadron 26, Captain William Hunnicutt, after discussion with the commanding officers, agreed that USS Charles P. Cecil DDR-835 and USS Stickell DDR-888, should sail for combat operations with no fewer than 225 men on board. The Stickell departs at 8:30 P.M. with only 150 of her crew aboard. Cecil gets underway shortly after with 200 and a mixed group of 100 men borrowed from other ships, 25 for the Cecil and 75 to be transferred to the Stickell upon rendezvous later.
To be continued... Woody
posted by Frank A. Wood at 11:28
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