50 Years Ago Today – As Cuban Situation Heats Up, Mullinnix at Valparaiso, Chile
Excerpt from “The Last Gun Ship - History of USS Mullinnix DD-944” - A Historical Novel By Frank A. Wood
14 October: In the early morning, a U-2 aircraft flies over western Cuba from south to north. The reconnaissance mission, piloted by Major Richard Heyser, is the first Strategic Air Command (SAC) mission after authority for the flights is transferred from the CIA to the air force. The photographs obtained by the mission provide the first hard evidence of MRBM sites in Cuba.
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Mid watch 14 October: Mullinnix is steaming from Concepcion Bay, Chile to Valparaiso. At 0745 the ship commenced ASW operations with Lester, Riveros, Williams, and Picuda. The majority of the day was spent in two ship search lines, stationint the ASW attack team, and conducting ASW exercises.
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15 October: All six U.S. Polaris ballistic missile submarines based in Holy Loch, Scotland, deploy to wartime stations. The Polaris boat USS Abraham Lincoln shortened her overhaul and deployed from Holy Loch along with two others from New London.
In the morning, quick readout teams at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in Washington analyze photos taken by Richard Heyser’s U-2 mission. Late in the afternoon, one of the teams finds pictures showing the main components of a Soviet MRBM in a field at San Cristobal. Analysis of reconnaissance photos during the day also identifies all but one of the remaining twenty-four SAM sites in Cuba. Other photographs of San Julian airfield show that IL-28 light bombers are being uncrated.
That evening, key Kennedy administration officials are tracked down in Washington and briefed about the discovery of the missiles. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, who is given the news by Ray Cline, decides to wait until morning to alert President Kennedy.
Meanwhile, the SGA orders the acceleration of covert activities against Cuba. In particular, the group agrees that “considerably more sabotage should be undertaken” and that “all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.”
A major US military exercise named PHIBRIGLEX-62 is scheduled to begin. The two-week long maneuver was to have employed twenty thousand Navy personnel and four thousand Marines in an amphibious assault on Puerto Rico’s Vieques Island and the overthrow of its imaginary tyrant, “Ortsac” – “Castro” spelled backwards. However, because of the impending crisis, PHIBRIGLEX-62 is used primarily as cover for troop and equipment deployments aimed at increasing military readiness for a strike on Cuba.
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0837 15 October: Mullinnix arrives at Valparaiso, Chile, mooring port side to Berth “A”.
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0845, 16 October: McGeorge Bundy informs President Kennedy that “hard photographic evidence” has been obtained showing Soviet MRBMs in Cuba.
1150, 16 October: President Kennedy calls together a group of his closest advisers (the group that becomes known as the “ExComm” – the Executive Committee of the National Security Council) at the White House. They are informed of the detailed photo intelligence identifying Soviet nuclear missile installations under construction on the island of Cuba. The president and his men discuss the dangerous decision of how the United States should respond.
In the afternoon, the missiles are identified as long range SS-4s. No nuclear warheads are reported seen in the area. CIA photo analyst Sidney Graybeal informs the group that “we do not believe the missiles are ready to fire.” Six additional U-2 missions are ordered and flown over Cuba later in the afternoon.
As discussions continue on proposals to destroy the missiles by airstrike, Robert Kennedy passes a note to the president: “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.”
1630 16 October: At the second ExComm meeting, Marshall Carter states that the missiles could be “fully operational within two weeks,” although a single missile might achieve operational capability “much sooner."
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara outlines three possible courses of action for the president: "the political course of action" of openly approaching Castro, Khrushchev, and U.S. allies in a gambit to resolve the crisis diplomatically, an option that McNamara and others considered unlikely to succeed; "a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance" coupled with "a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba"; and "military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles." Much of the conversation centers on the military option and the hazardous unknowns of Soviet retaliation, including the possibility of nuclear escalation. "I don't believe we have considered the consequences," McNamara tells the president. "I don't know quite what kind of a world we live in after we've struck Cuba, and we, we've started it.... How, how do we stop at that point?"
In Moscow, Premier Khrushchev receives US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler for a three-hour conversation in a variety of subjects. Khrushchev reassures Kohler that the Cuban fishing port that the Soviet Union has recently agreed to help build will remain entirely nonmilitary. Once again, Khrushchev insists that all Soviet activity in Cuba was defensive and sharply criticizes US bases in Turkey and Italy.
To be continued... Woody
14 October: In the early morning, a U-2 aircraft flies over western Cuba from south to north. The reconnaissance mission, piloted by Major Richard Heyser, is the first Strategic Air Command (SAC) mission after authority for the flights is transferred from the CIA to the air force. The photographs obtained by the mission provide the first hard evidence of MRBM sites in Cuba.
In the morning, quick readout teams at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in Washington analyze photos taken by Richard Heyser’s U-2 mission. Late in the afternoon, one of the teams finds pictures showing the main components of a Soviet MRBM in a field at San Cristobal. Analysis of reconnaissance photos during the day also identifies all but one of the remaining twenty-four SAM sites in Cuba. Other photographs of San Julian airfield show that IL-28 light bombers are being uncrated.
That evening, key Kennedy administration officials are tracked down in Washington and briefed about the discovery of the missiles. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, who is given the news by Ray Cline, decides to wait until morning to alert President Kennedy.
Meanwhile, the SGA orders the acceleration of covert activities against Cuba. In particular, the group agrees that “considerably more sabotage should be undertaken” and that “all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.”
A major US military exercise named PHIBRIGLEX-62 is scheduled to begin. The two-week long maneuver was to have employed twenty thousand Navy personnel and four thousand Marines in an amphibious assault on Puerto Rico’s Vieques Island and the overthrow of its imaginary tyrant, “Ortsac” – “Castro” spelled backwards. However, because of the impending crisis, PHIBRIGLEX-62 is used primarily as cover for troop and equipment deployments aimed at increasing military readiness for a strike on Cuba.
1150, 16 October: President Kennedy calls together a group of his closest advisers (the group that becomes known as the “ExComm” – the Executive Committee of the National Security Council) at the White House. They are informed of the detailed photo intelligence identifying Soviet nuclear missile installations under construction on the island of Cuba. The president and his men discuss the dangerous decision of how the United States should respond.
In the afternoon, the missiles are identified as long range SS-4s. No nuclear warheads are reported seen in the area. CIA photo analyst Sidney Graybeal informs the group that “we do not believe the missiles are ready to fire.” Six additional U-2 missions are ordered and flown over Cuba later in the afternoon.
As discussions continue on proposals to destroy the missiles by airstrike, Robert Kennedy passes a note to the president: “I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor.”
1630 16 October: At the second ExComm meeting, Marshall Carter states that the missiles could be “fully operational within two weeks,” although a single missile might achieve operational capability “much sooner."
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara outlines three possible courses of action for the president: "the political course of action" of openly approaching Castro, Khrushchev, and U.S. allies in a gambit to resolve the crisis diplomatically, an option that McNamara and others considered unlikely to succeed; "a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance" coupled with "a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba"; and "military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles." Much of the conversation centers on the military option and the hazardous unknowns of Soviet retaliation, including the possibility of nuclear escalation. "I don't believe we have considered the consequences," McNamara tells the president. "I don't know quite what kind of a world we live in after we've struck Cuba, and we, we've started it.... How, how do we stop at that point?"
In Moscow, Premier Khrushchev receives US Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler for a three-hour conversation in a variety of subjects. Khrushchev reassures Kohler that the Cuban fishing port that the Soviet Union has recently agreed to help build will remain entirely nonmilitary. Once again, Khrushchev insists that all Soviet activity in Cuba was defensive and sharply criticizes US bases in Turkey and Italy.
To be continued... Woody
posted by Frank A. Wood at 12:01
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